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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Deyvi Alexander De Leon petitions for review of a final order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA’s order (1) upheld a decision of an Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”) denying De Leon’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b and (2) denied De Leon’s motion to remand. We will deny De Leon’s petition 
for review. We write for the parties, who are familiar with the record. 
I1 
Section 1229b(b)(1)(D) provides that an otherwise deportable alien may obtain 
cancellation of removal if he, among other conditions, “establishes that removal would 
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or 
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.” The BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that De Leon’s child, mother, and father 
would not suffer “extremely unusual hardship” because of his removal, thus precluding 
cancellation of removal. 
“We lack jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b, including ‘exceptional and extremely unusual’ hardship determinations.” Patel 
v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). 
Instead, “[o]ur jurisdiction . . . is ‘narrowly circumscribed’ . . . to ‘colorable claims or 
 
1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where, as here, “the ‘BIA’s opinion 
directly states that the BIA is deferring to the IJ, or invokes specific aspects of the IJ’s 
analysis and factfinding in support of the BIA’s conclusions,’ we review both decisions.” 
Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y 




questions of law.’” Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). A claim is not colorable if “it is immaterial and made solely for the pur-
pose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Pareja, 615 F.3d 
at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 
500, 513 n.10 (2006)). We review questions of law de novo. Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y 
Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017). 
As described in Part II, De Leon argues that the IJ violated his statutory, regula-
tory, and Fifth Amendment procedural due-process rights during the cancellation-of-
removal proceeding. In removal proceedings, “the alien shall have a reasonable oppor-
tunity . . . to present evidence on the alien’s own behalf.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). The 
alien must demonstrate that a violation of § 1229a(b)(4)(B) prejudiced him. See, e.g., 
Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 736, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (to demonstrate a violation of 
§ 1229a(b)(4)(B), the alien “must show ‘prejudice such that the IJ’s mistake impacted the 
outcome of the proceedings’” (quoting Pronsivakulchai v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 903, 907 
(7th Cir. 2006))); Patel v. Sessions, 868 F.3d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 2017) (same); see also 
Ponce-Leiva v. Att’y Gen., 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that an IJ did not 
violate an alien’s statutory right to counsel because the “facial lack of merit” to the 
alien’s claim meant any violation made no difference in the result of the proceedings). By 
regulation, an IJ must also “[a]dvise” an alien that he “ha[s] a reasonable opportunity . . . 
to present evidence in his . . . own behalf.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2021).  




[cancellation of] removal proceeding.” See Calderon-Rosas v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 378, 
386 (3d Cir. 2020). To establish a due-process violation, an alien must show that (1) “he 
was prevented from reasonably presenting his case” and (2) “the infraction has 
‘the potential for affecting the outcome of [the] deportation proceedings.’” Serrano-
Alberto, 859 F.3d at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Fadiga v. Att’y 
Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007); then quoting Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 
694 (3d Cir. 2006)) (emphasis omitted).  
II 
A 
De Leon argues that the IJ violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional 
procedural rights in four ways during his cancellation-of-removal proceeding. All four 
arguments fail. 
First, De Leon argues that the IJ violated his statutory right to “present evidence,” 
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B), and his due-process right to “present[] his case,” Serrano-
Alberto, 859 F.3d at 213, when the IJ denied a continuance De Leon sought to give him-
self time to provide documentation at the cancellation-of-removal proceeding. Even 
assuming the IJ erred, this argument fails because De Leon cannot demonstrate that the 
lack of documentation at the proceeding prejudiced him, that is it had the potential to 
affect the outcome of the proceedings. See Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 321 n.7 (4th Cir. 
2002) (reviewing an alien’s statutory and constitutional rights to present evidence in the 





The IJ invited De Leon to testify regarding the contents of the documents he 
sought to present, and De Leon and his mother subsequently testified to the contents of 
the documents. The IJ found De Leon and his mother credible and relied on their testi-
mony to find the facts that De Leon sought to establish through the absent documenta-
tion. For example, the documents included medical records De Leon sought to use to 
establish his father’s dementia diagnosis and his mother’s workplace injury. But the IJ 
did not need to see the documents because the IJ found that De Leon’s father was begin-
ning to suffer from a medical issue, possibly “Alzheimer’s and dementia.” A.R. 194. The 
IJ also found that De Leon’s mother suffered an injury, rendering her unable to work.  
The documents also included De Leon’s income tax returns, which he wanted to 
use to establish that he provided for his child and parents. But the IJ did not need to see 
the tax returns because the IJ found that De Leon had filed the returns and was making 
sixteen dollars an hour as a sales representative before his detention. This finding 
removed the need to see the actual tax returns to understand the level of financial support 
De Leon provided to his child and parents. Other documents included evidence of citizen-
ship for his child and father, but the IJ assumed that they were citizens in his decision. 
Lastly, the documents included letters from his pastor and landlord attesting to his good 
moral character. These documents were not relevant to the ground on which the agency 
based its decision; the BIA affirmed the denial of his cancellation-of-removal application 
because De Leon’s child, mother, and father would not suffer an “extremely unusual 




had a “good moral character,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), as the letters attempted to 
show. 
Relevant to the hardship determination, the IJ found the facts that De Leon sought 
to establish with the absent documentation. Nonetheless, the IJ found that De Leon had 
not demonstrated an “extremely unusual hardship” to De Leon’s child and parents if he 
were removed. A.R. 192–96. Thus, De Leon has not shown that the denial of the continu-
ance violated due process because it did not prejudice him, regardless of an alleged statu-
tory or constitutional violation.2 
Second, De Leon argues that the IJ did not tell him that he could “present his own 
affirmative testimony in narrative form or any other form.” Pet’r Br. 41. De Leon claims 
that this alleged omission would violate the IJ’s regulatory obligation to “[a]dvise” him 
that he would “have a reasonable opportunity . . . to present evidence in his . . . own 
behalf,” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4), and his due-process right to “present[] his case,” 
Serrano-Alberto, 859 F.3d at 213. The record contradicts De Leon’s claim. At his 
removal proceeding, the IJ read De Leon his rights, including “the right to present your 
own evidence, including documents, witnesses and your own testimony.” A.R. 218. 
Later, at the cancellation-of-removal proceeding, the IJ invited De Leon to testify on his 
 
2 De Leon also argues that the IJ abused his discretion when he refused to grant a 
continuance so that De Leon could submit his documentation. See generally Hashmi v. 
Att’y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008). Like De Leon’s statutory and due-process 
claims regarding the denial of the continuance, this claim requires De Leon to 
demonstrate that the refusal to grant the continuance prejudiced him. Matter of Sibrun, 18 
I. & N. Dec. 354, 356 (BIA 1983). As shown in the analysis of De Leon’s statutory and 
due-process claims regarding the continuance, De Leon has not demonstrated prejudice, 




own behalf, an invitation De Leon accepted. Thus, the IJ sufficiently advised De Leon of 
his right to testify. 
Third, De Leon argues that he “was not given the opportunity to call his father as a 
witness,” Pet’r Br. 47–49, in violation of his statutory right to “present evidence,” 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B), and his due-process right to “present[] his case.” Serrano-
Alberto, 859 F.3d at 213. Again, even assuming the IJ erred, this argument fails because 
the lack of testimony from his father did not prejudice De Leon or have the potential to 
do so. See Davis v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 168, 177 (1st Cir. 2015) (requiring the alien to show 
that the exclusion of evidence prejudiced his case). 
De Leon asserts that De Leon’s father would have testified regarding “the severity 
and progression of [his] father’s illness, the ability of his mother to take care of his father 
now and in the future, and the hardship [De Leon]’s deportation would have on his par-
ents.” Pet’r Br. 48–49. But De Leon and his mother extensively testified to these issues, 
and the IJ found them credible. Thus, the IJ did not need to hear further testimony from 
De Leon’s father to establish a record on these issues, and any alleged exclusion of De 
Leon’s father’s testimony did not prejudice De Leon or have the potential to do so. 
Fourth, De Leon argues that by failing to “follow[] up” with questions for De 
Leon and his mother after their testimony the IJ did not “fully develop the record as 
required by the Due Process clause, statutes, and regulations.” Pet’r Br. 51. De Leon cites 
no statute or regulation requiring the IJ to develop the record by asking the alien particu-




hold that an IJ had an affirmative obligation to develop the record under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 859 F.3d at 224 n.8. 
B 
In addition to his appeal, De Leon filed a motion to remand with the BIA based on 
the IJ’s denial of De Leon’s motion to reconsider the IJ’s decision. De Leon claims that 
the BIA abused its discretion in denying De Leon’s motion for remand “because it 
engaged in no actual . . . review” of the IJ’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. Pet’r 
Br. 53. On the contrary, the BIA considered and denied De Leon’s motion, so this argu-
ment fails. De Leon also claims that the BIA erred in treating De Leon’s motion for 
remand as a motion to reopen, potentially preventing De Leon from filing a motion to 
reopen in the future. Section 1229a(c)(7)(A) provides that “[a]n alien may file one motion 
to reopen” in immigration proceedings subject to certain exceptions. De Leon fears that if 
he chooses to file a motion to reopen in the future, the BIA might deny it because it 
believes De Leon has already used his one opportunity to file a motion to reopen. De 
Leon’s argument fails because it is not ripe; he does not indicate that he intends to file a 
motion to reopen, and the BIA has not denied this hypothetical motion.  
* * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
